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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

11 January 1953

SUBJECT: DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-55/2: COMMUNIST
CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN
KOREA (for Board consideration)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Communist capabilities and probable
courses of action in Korea through 1953.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. STATUS OF COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES IN KOREA

A. Ground Forces

1. What is the present strength, composition, and
disposition of Communist ground forces in Korea?
How does this figure compare with Communist
strength in Korea in mid-1951 (the initiation of
armistice negotiations)? How does the present
relative Communist and UNC strength compare with
that of mid-1951?

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2. What Communist reserves are available in Manchuria and China for commitment in Korea (exclusive of Soviet forces in the Far East)? How does this figure compare with mid-1951?
 3. What is the present combat effectiveness of Communist troops in Korea? What changes have there been in this combat effectiveness since mid-1951?
 - a. What changes have taken place in tactics?
 - b. What has been the effect of re-equipment and reorganization?
 - c. How does Communist fire power compare with UN fire power?
 - d. What is the state of morale?
 - e. What is the state of training?
 4. What portion of Communist troop strength is now required to maintain internal security in North Korea?
 5. What is the present logistical situation of the Communist forces in Korea?
 - a. How effective is the Communist supply system within North Korea?

(1) What is the status of the transportation system?

(2) What is the food situation in North Korea? In China, including Manchuria?

b. What are the various sources of supply?

(1) What is the scale and nature of supplies delivered to Korea from the USSR?

(2) From Manchuria? and China proper?

(3) From other sources?

c. How has the Communist supply system in Korea been affected by UNC operations?

B. Air Forces

1. What is the strength, disposition, composition, and combat effectiveness of the Communist Air Force in China (CAFIC)?*

* Include a graphic and tabular presentation of Communist air strength since the outbreak of the Korean War together with a strength forecast through the period of this estimate. Include also a tabular presentation of the performance characteristics of CAFIC and SAF aircraft which conceivably could be committed to the Korean theater of operations during the period of this estimate.

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- a. How does this compare with mid-1951?
- b. How does the present relative Communist and UNC strength compare with that of mid-1951?
- c. What is the extent of Soviet participation in the CAFIC?
2. What is the strength, disposition, composition, and combat effectiveness of the Soviet Air Force (SAF) in the Far East? How does this compare with mid-1951?
3. What is the airfield situation?
 - a. In North Korea?
 - b. In Communist China?
 - c. In the Soviet Far East?
4. What is the logistic situation in the CAFIC?
5. What is the maximum number of CAFIC aircraft, by types, that could be committed on the initial strike of a major air offensive?
 - a. Without redeployment?
 - b. With redeployment?
6. What average daily sortie rate, by aircraft types, could be sustained after an initial air strike?

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C. Naval Forces

1. What is the strength and effectiveness of naval forces available to the Chinese Communists and North Koreans?

II. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN THE KOREAN AREA

- A. What are current CAFIC capabilities to wage air warfare in the Korean theater of operations?
- B. What are current Communist capabilities to conduct ground force operations in Korea with present Communist employment of air power?
- C. How would Communist capabilities to conduct ground force operations in Korea be affected if, at the same time:
 1. The Communists exercised their maximum capabilities to employ air forces over Communist-held territory in Korea?
 2. The Communists exercised their maximum capabilities to employ air forces over the entire Korean theater of operations?
- D. What are current Chinese Communist air defense capabilities? By day? All-weather?
 - a. In Manchuria?
 - b. Elsewhere in Communist China?
- E. What trends are expected in enemy capabilities in Korea during the period of this estimate?

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1. Under continued conditions of a stale-mated war?
 2. Provided a cease-fire is achieved?
- F. How would Communist capabilities in Korea be affected if, during the period of this estimate, the Chinese Communists were to:
1. Attempt, short of open invasion, to step up considerably their present assistance to the Viet Minh?
 2. Attempt to invade Indochina?
 3. Attempt to invade Taiwan?
 4. Others?
- G. How would Communist capabilities be affected if, during the period of this estimate, the UNC were:
1. To impose a naval blockade on Communist China?
 2. To attack CAFIC bases in Communist China?
 3. To interdict lines of communications in Manchuria and Communist China?
 4. To employ other than conventional weapons against the Communists in Korea? In Communist China as well?

5. To assist Chinese Nationalist offensive operations against Communist China?
6. Any combination of the above?

III. CURRENT INDICATIONS OF COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

What indications of Communist intentions with respect to Korea can be discerned from:

- A. Communist military activities in Korea, China, and the rest of the Far East?
- B. Communist military activities outside the Far East?
- C. Soviet and Chinese Communist diplomacy, including Soviet action in the UN?
- D. Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda?
- E. Internal Soviet developments?
- F. Internal Chinese Communist developments?

IV. FACTORS AFFECTING COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

To what extent and in what manner will Communist courses of action in Korea be influenced by:

- A. Soviet global interests?
- B. Over-all Sino-Soviet interests in Asia?
- C. The respective interests of Communist China and the USSR in:

1. Japan?
 2. Southeast Asia?
 3. North Korea?
 4. Taiwan?
 5. Elsewhere in Asia?
- D. The effect of the Korean war to date on the economy and economic planning of Communist China?
- E. The relative cost to date of the Korean war to the Communists and to the UNC, in terms of manpower and material losses?
- F. Possible major developments in:
1. Soviet policies elsewhere in the world?
 2. Soviet internal affairs?
 3. The European Satellites?
 4. Western Europe?
 5. The Near and Middle East?
 6. Other?
- G. US and/or UN actions:
1. A substantial increase in US and/or UN strength in Korea? In Indochina? On Taiwan? Elsewhere in the Far East?
 2. The launching of a major offensive in Korea?
 3. The imposition of a naval blockade on Communist China?

4. The employment of all weapons in Korea?
5. The extension of the air war to Manchuria?
To all of China?
 - a. With conventional weapons?
 - b. With all weapons?
6. The assisting of Chinese Nationalist offensive operations against the Chinese Communists?
7. The undertaking of any combination of the above?

V. PROBABLE COMMUNIST COURSES OF ACTION

What are probable Communist courses of action with respect to:

- A. Resumption of armistice negotiations?
- B. Military operations in Korea?
- C. Military operations elsewhere in the Far East?
- D. Increased Soviet participation in the Korean war?
- E. Extension of the Korean war to a general war in
the Far East?
- F. Extension of the Korean war to a global war?